Visible public keys do not mean that private keys have been exposed or that funds can be stolen today: no publicly demonstrated quantum computer can break Bitcoin’s elliptic-curve signatures. A sufficiently powerful future machine could, in theory, derive private keys from visible public keys. Glassnode attributed 25.8% of supply exposure to address reuse, including 11.6% held on exchanges; other exposed coins are in older address formats and transaction structures. Its November 10 estimate was up from an October estimate of more than 6 million BTC, or 31.2% of circulating coins. The data do not show how many exposed holdings are permanently inaccessible or whether their owners could migrate them. Cysic CEO Leo Fan said the challenge is not just developing new cryptography: holders and infrastructure providers must also complete the transition. “The clock that matters is migration,” he said. Bitcoin developers are divided over what that migration should require. In April, Jameson Lopp and five other developers proposed BIP 361, which outlines a phased retirement of ECDSA and Schnorr signatures. It would first restrict payments to addresses using vulnerable signatures, then add requirements for spending coins that had not moved to safer addresses. The proposed schedule would run for several years after a compatible post-quantum transaction system is activated. Lopp has argued that restricting dormant holdings could be preferable to leaving them vulnerable to theft. Blockstream CEO Adam Back supports voluntary upgrades and opposes a fixed deadline that could lock legitimate owners out of their funds. Neither view is Bitcoin policy. A separate draft, BIP 360, proposes a Pay-to-Merkle-Root output that removes Taproot’s key-path spending option. It could reduce some risks from long-exposed public keys, but does not itself add quantum-resistant signatures or eliminate every attack. “Coins that never move are a social problem, not a technical one,” Fan said. Custodians face a separate hurdle: exchanges and asset managers often divide transaction approvals among people or machines using multisignature systems or multi-party computation. NIST finalized post-quantum signature standards in 2024, but threshold-cryptography implementations remain under development. In January 2026, NIST issued a call for proposals on threshold cryptography, in which participants jointly perform operations while keeping key control distributed. BitGo and Silence Laboratories reported a simulated post-quantum transaction in May using the ML-DSA signature standard in an MPC system; they have not announced a production deployment. Coinbase has called for a gradual transition, citing signature sizes, fees, network capacity and wallet compatibility. Bridges add another layer. Rootstock’s PowPeg locks Bitcoin on the Bitcoin network and supports corresponding RBTC on its sidechain. Its roadmap schedules protocol-level post-quantum signatures and hybrid accounts for 2027, followed by assisted account migration in 2028. The work also includes upgrades to signing infrastructure and hardware security protections, but Rootstock cannot change Bitcoin’s base protocol. Other networks have introduced account-level options: NEAR added ML-DSA transaction signing in a July mainnet upgrade, while Algorand launched native Falcon-1024 accounts in August. Broader institutional multisignature support and further wallet integrations are still in development.

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