In a November 17 post on X, Buterin said Canada was facing “its own version of the Chat Control mess.” He urged support for “backdoor-free, no asterisks” end-to-end encryption, calling it important to a “secure, free and open society.” He also called on governments to minimize backdoors and mass data collection as AI changes cybersecurity risks, and linked to an October 8 Mozilla paper criticizing the bill’s potential effects on encryption.
The Lawful Access Act, 2026, passed the House of Commons on June 18 and cleared second reading in the Senate on October 22. It was then referred to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs. A November 16 hearing included Meta, Signal, privacy advocates and legal experts. Committee review, report stage, third reading and royal assent remain pending.
Part 2 would allow the government to require providers to build and maintain technical capabilities for lawful access, but the order itself would not grant access to data. The House-passed text says providers cannot be forced to decrypt customer-encrypted information, or enable authorities to decrypt it, when the provider did not supply the encryption or hold the necessary key. It also bars technical obligations that would create a systemic vulnerability or prevent a provider from fixing one.
The bill broadly defines electronic service providers, but does not name crypto exchanges, wallet providers or self-custody apps. A centralized exchange or hosted wallet serving Canadians could fall within the definition if it stores account details or processes transactions; coverage would depend on how a service operates. The text does not require self-custody developers to hold users’ private keys.
The core-provider schedule is left for future regulations. Those providers could be required to retain specified metadata for up to six months, but not message content, browsing history or social media activity. The public safety minister could also issue orders to other electronic service providers, lasting up to two years and requiring approval from the Intelligence Commissioner. Providers must have an opportunity to make representations, though disclosure of orders is restricted.
Ottawa says investigators would still need legal authorization to obtain personal information and that the bill grants no direct access to company systems. Critics dispute whether its safeguards are sufficient. Mozilla said there is “no safe way to create exceptional access to encrypted data that only the intended actor can use.” Privacy Commissioner Philippe Dufresne welcomed amendments protecting end-to-end encryption but sought clearer limits on subscriber information and a necessity-and-proportionality test. The UN Human Rights Office said the bill “threatens to undermine end-to-end encryption” and urged an explicit safeguard for critical technical protections.
The EU comparison is not exact: the bloc’s proposed child sexual abuse rules concern detecting and reporting abuse material, including contested scanning of private messages. Talks on detection remain unresolved. A separate temporary EU measure allowing voluntary detection runs until April 3, 2028, and excludes end-to-end encrypted communications, according to the Council of the EU.

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